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PANEL INTRODUCTION
MODERATOR, ROBERT K. GOLDMAN
PROFESSOR OF LAW, WASHINGTON COLLEGE OF LAW

Ladies and gentlemen, we are going to start this afternoon's session. My name is Bob Goldman. I teach here at the Washington
College of Law. I am also Co-Director of the Center for Human
Rights and Humanitarian Law.
This panel is entitled "The Contribution of Ad Hoc Tribunals to
International Humanitarian Law." We have a fine group of people to
talk about this subject today. As you know, there have been some
slight changes in the program. Unfortunately, Georges Abi-Saab, at
the last moment, was not able to attend, which puts more of a burden
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on some of our other speakers. I am going to introduce them now,
but it would take too long to go into the biographies of all of these
people.
To my far right, that is only geographically-and there is a reason
I am going to proceed geographically-is my good friend Professor
Ted Meron, the Charles L. Denison Professor of Law at New York
University Law School. Professor Meron is one of the outstanding
legal scholars in the field of both human rights and humanitarian law.
He is also the person who discovered that Shakespeare really knew
how to write rules of engagement. Also to my right is Patricia
Viseur-Sellers, the Legal Advisor for Gender-Related Crimes of the
Office of the Prosecutor for both Tribunals.
To my left is Payam Akhavan, who also is a Legal Advisor with
the Office of the Prosecutor for the two Tribunals. Finally, at my far
left geographically, is my co-teacher in the law of war class here, W.
Hays Parks, Special Assistant to the Judge Advocate General of the
Army.
With this, I would like to ask Professor Meron to begin his remarks.

THE HAGUE TRIBUNAL: WORKING TO CLARIFY
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW
PRESENTATION BY THEODOR MERON
CHARLES L. DENISON PROFESSOR OF LAW, NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW SCHOOL

INTRODUCTION

Thank you so much, Diane, for inviting me to this important conference and to you, Bob, for your very kind remarks. It is nice to be
on a program with so many good friends, including Patricia and
Payam from The Hague, as well as many others. I would like to start
by saying that despite all the difficult problems that the international
community still faces, especially in the context of the Rome conference, there actually is good cause for some heady feeling.
In looking back at the ground-breaking achievements in international humanitarian law over the last few years-with about twenty
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individuals in custody-the International Criminal Tribunal for the
former Yugoslavia is no longer in danger of running out of defendants. The Hague Tribunal has issued several important decisions
that clarify and give judicial interpretation to some fundamental rules
of international humanitarian law.
The Rwanda Tribunal is functioning effectively, despite the problems that plagued it during the first few years of its existence. Most
of the indicted persons in Rwanda are in custody. The Rwanda Tribunal also has issued an important judgment on its competence and
on the Security Council's competence, under Chapter VII, to establish the tribunal. We may expect some important judgments from
that tribunal this year.
Beyond this, the work of both Tribunals has demonstrated that international investigation and international prosecution of persons responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian law are
possible and credible. This work has created a very positive environment for the establishment of a standing international criminal
court. Equally important, these developments have given new vigor
to principles of universal jurisdiction, and have encouraged at least
some prosecutions by various states of persons responsible for gross
violations.
The development of these institutions is ground-breaking. The
Hague, Rwanda, and the prospect for a permanent tribunal, however,
are actually dwarfed by the developments that have taken place during the last few years in the substantive normative aspects of international humanitarian law. There is no question that international humanitarian law has developed significantly since the atrocities in
Yugoslavia began. This area of law has grown much more during
these last few years than in the half-century following Nuremberg.
I would like to turn now to the question of the contribution that the
Yugoslav Tribunal made to the clarification and development of international humanitarian law. There is no question that such important contributions, apart from the substantive area of international
humanitarian law, also have taken place with regard to general principles of criminal law, particularly with regard to duress and superior
orders. I have no doubt that before long, the Tribunal at The Hague,
and perhaps also in Arusha, will make very significant contributions
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to a further clarification of the very difficult concept of command responsibility.
I. DEFINING CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY

Regarding substantive humanitarian law, the first, and perhaps
foremost, contribution of The Hague Tribunal was to advance the
concept of the applicability of The Hague law to non-international
conflicts. The Hague Tribunal has also given a very expansive, yet
credible, reading to international customary law. Clarifying crimes
against humanity has been one of the Tribunal's important contributions.
In the Tadic case, the Tribunal confirmed that customary international law requires no nexus between crimes against humanity and a
state of armed conflict. Interpreting the Statute's requirement that
crimes against humanity be directed against any civilian population,
the Tribunal held that such crimes must involve a course of conduct,
not one particular act. The Tribunal balanced that statement by emphasizing that as long as there is a link with widespread or systematic
attack against a civilian population, a single act could qualify as a
crime against humanity.
Although the crimes against humanity that the Tribunal emphasized in Tadic can be committed only against civilian populations,
the Tribunal construed the term "civilian population" very broadly.
Thus, a person who commits a crime against a single person or a
very small number of victims could be guilty of crimes against humanity.
The Tribunal defined "crimes against humanity" in a similar manner. The Tribunal construed Article V disjunctively. Taking this approach, the Tribunal allowed fulfillment of the requirement that acts
be directed against a civilian population, if the acts are either widespread or systematic. The acts do not have to be both. The United
States delegation supported the Tribunal's disjunctive approach when
it submitted definitions of offenses to the Preparatory Committee in
New York a few days ago.
Even more important, now that we see so many non-governmental
actors, is the fact that the Tribunal is departing from the post-Second
World War understanding of international law and holds that states
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and non-governmental actors alike may commit crimes against humanity.
I find less persuasive, however, the Tribunal's holding in Tadic
that all crimes against humanity, not only persecution, require discriminatory intent. The Tribunal recognized explicitly that it was departing from customary law and from the practice of the Nuremberg
tribunals, which did not impose such a requirement. There was no
reason, in my view, for the Tribunal to regard the more restrictive report of the Secretary General as if it were a gospel binding on it.
The Tribunal should have followed, and I hope that it might consider following in the future, the Nuremberg jurisprudence, which reflects customary international law. Establishing crimes against humanity is difficult enough without adding to the requirements
imposed on the prosecution and requiring more than is necessary or
justified under international customary law.

II.

DETERMINATION OF WHETHER A CONFLICT IS INTERNATIONAL

A number of other decisions made at The Hague are also not entirely persuasive. I would like to turn to the trial chamber's decision
of May 7, 1997 in the case of Tadic, which considered the question
whether the conflict in Bosnia was international in character. If so,
the provisions of the Geneva Conventions would apply to that conflict, as would other provisions of international humanitarian law that
are applicable to such conflicts.
The majority of the Tribunal decided to resolve this question by
relying on the ruling and the standards suggested by the International
Court of Justice ("ICJ") in the famous Nicaragua case. The Hague
Tribunal's application of the Nicaraguajudgment was inappropriate,
however, because the question considered by the ICJ in that case was
completely different. In Nicaragua, the ICJ considered whether the
Contras were, for legal purposes, either an organ of the United States
government, or acting on behalf of the United States. If either were
true, the Tribunal could attribute the acts of the Contras to the United
States for purposes of state responsibility.
The nexus between attribution and the character of the conflict
found in Tadic was, in my view, never present in ICJ's Nicaragua
discussion. In the Rajic case, the trial chamber asked the prosecutor
to present a brief on the attribution standard. Influenced by the Rajic
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opinion, the court in Tadic accepted attribution as the gravamen of its
decision, despite the fact that attribution has nothing to do with the
determination of the conflict's character.
The attribution standard, I would like to add, is almost entirely absent from serious law of war literature. If you read the definitive
works on the subject by people from the International Committee of
the Red Cross ("ICRC") and others, you find that there is generally
no mention of imputability or attribution.
To demonstrate the dangers and artificiality of the Nicaragla
standard as applied in Tadic, consider a conflict in a country where
practically all the fighting is done by a foreign power alongside the
rebels, but where the rebels maintain their independence from the
intervening country. Thus, this conflict does not satisfy the Nicaragua criterion. Could anyone seriously suggest, however, that this is
not an international armed conflict?
III. CONSTRUCTION OF THE "GRAVE BREACHES" PROVISIONS
The Tribunal's jurisprudence on another question is one with
which I am not happy. I have in mind the construction and application of the "grave breaches" provisions of the Geneva Conventions.
The grave breaches, I need not tell you, are the principal crimes under the Geneva Conventions.
Because the Tribunal decided in the Tadic case that it could not
apply the grave breaches provisions, it was in fact deprived of the
core of international criminal law in cases deemed to be noninternational. The Tribunal is thus tempted to raise the level of actionable violence to crimes against humanity or, perhaps in the future, to genocide. This limitation handicaps the Tribunal's ability to
carry out its mandate. Some commentators have observed, and I believe they have a point, that one should not resort to such heavy artillery in the case of evil, but relatively minor, offenders.
The Tribunal could have avoided these difficulties if the appeals
chamber in the Tadic case had agreed with the prosecutor and the
United States government that the situation in Bosnia amounted to
one international armed conflict, to which the grave breaches provisions of the Geneva Conventions and The Hague law applied. Instead, the appeals tribunal left the determination of the nature of the
conflict in each case to the trial chambers, thus creating the potential
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for a crazy quilt of situations, norms, and normative inequality between two defendants operating in the same kind of environment.
For those who do not agree that the conflict was in fact an international armed conflict, Judge Georges Abi-Saab proposed another option in Tadic, in his separate opinion. His proposal was for the Tribunal to include grave breaches within the customary international
law, which the Tribunal was willing and ready to apply to noninternational armed conflicts.
In its amicus briefs submitted in those proceedings, the United
States expressed support for the notion that persons covered by
common Article 3 could be considered protected persons under the
Geneva Conventions. The Tribunal's enlightened vision of customary law as applicable to non-international armed conflicts, and indeed
to international armed conflicts, certainly could have encompassed
the grave breaches provisions of the Geneva Conventions.
The grave breaches issue presents one other problem that will
continue to plague the Tribunal, and I would like to face it squarely.
The grave breaches provisions describe certain acts as criminal and
subject the offenders to mandatory prosecution or extradition only
when those acts are committed against protected persons. The Fourth
Geneva Convention defines "protected persons" as persons in the
hands of a party to the conflict, of which they are not nationals. Enforcing this nationality provision literally in the Yugoslav conflict
and in other similar conflicts involving the disintegration of states or
political entities in one country and the resulting struggle, is the
height of legalism.
Imagine, for example, that in the Israeli-Arab war in 1947-1948,
both the Jews and Arabs had a common Palestinian nationality.
Imagine further that the Geneva Conventions were already in place.
Would you agree that it would be complete nonsense to deny protected status to those captured by the other parties in the conflict just
because the groups still formally shared a nationality? Is this not also
true at least to some extent in the Yugoslav situation? We must have
a different interpretation of the grave breaches provisions, at least in
the increasingly common situation of disintegrating states.
In light of the Geneva Conventions' protective goals, I therefore
support a different interpretation of Article 4 of the Fourth Geneva
Conventions-especially in situations like Yugoslavia, where the
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fighting was pervasive, and where there was a history as a single
state resulting in one nationality. In this instance, I would construe
the requirement of a different nationality as something that can be
satisfied simply by being in the hands of the adversary.
Indeed, the ICRC, in its commentary on Article 4, stated that the
reason for excluding a country's own nationals from the definition of
"protected persons" was to avoid interfering in the relations between
the government and the governed in one country. This concern obviously is not relevant to the circumstances prevailing in the Tadic
case, in which each ethnic group regards every other ethnic group as
an enemy.
To conclude on this point, I believe that the appeals chamber could
make a very important contribution by rejecting the Nicaragua standard, and adopting a more flexible, up-to-date interpretation of the
grave breaches provisions. The question whether the conflict is international or not should be decided by common-sensical, time-tested
approaches of public international law. Considerations driving this
analysis include: the reality, dimensions, scope, and duration of a
foreign military intervention; the direct participation by the foreign
power or powers in the hostilities; the nature of the states and entities; their recognition by foreign states; the attitude of the United
Nations Security Council; the relative involvement of local and foreign forces; and, generally, considerations of all the relevant strategic
military factions.
Several important authorities, including Professor Pellet, for instance, citing the example of former-Yugoslavia, state clearly that it
is the military intervention of a foreign power that catalyzes the conversion of a conflict from internal to international and that imputability is irrelevant here. The situation is complicated enough even
without this consideration.
CONCLUSION
In concluding, let me say that it is just marvelous that, in just a few
years, we have reached a stage in which we find the existence of international criminal tribunals such a natural development. We discuss
the tribunals, even criticize some of their approaches or judgments,
as if they have been with us for the last generation or century
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Because I was critical on a limited number of aspects, let me say
that overall, The Hague Tribunal, the judges, the prosecutors, and the
registrars, have all done an extraordinarily effective job. They have
been extremely successful and we owe them gratitude, very deep
gratitude as we move forward towards the creation of a permanent
criminal court.

THE DILEMMAS OF JURISPRUDENCE
PRESENTATION BY PAYAM AKHAVAN
LEGAL ADVISOR, OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR

INTRODUCTION

First, I want to express my honor at the invitation to attend this
conference, and especially the pleasure of seeing my friend, Diane
Orentlicher, again. I also would like to thank the students from the
Washington College of Law who, over the past two or three years,
have provided us with several outstanding legal memoranda in relation to the work we are doing.
I will speak very briefly, not so much about the substantive law of
the Tribunal, but about what I see as being a central question in terms
of jurisprudence-the dilemmas of jurisprudence.
I. INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW: REALITY V. UTOPIA

In particular, I want to use, as a starting point, a comment made by
Professor Meron in an article he wrote for the 1987 issue of The
American Journal of International Law, entitled the Geneva Conventions as Customary Law. I will not say it with the same eloquence
as Professor Meron, but he wrote of the tendency of courts applying
humanitarian law to blur the distinction between what we, in international law, call lex feranda and lex lata. There is a distinction between law as it is, and the law as it ought to be, the law as it may
emerge in the future, or the law as we would like it to be.
Martti Koskenniemi, the distinguished Finnish international jurist,
puts it a different way. He speaks about the tension in international
legal argument between apology and utopia. He says international
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law is sometimes an apology for state power based on the reality that
the law is simply rules that states consent to be bound by. There is
another tendency that looks at the law not in terms of power realities
or state consent, but in terms of considerations of justice, humanity,
and fairness, or in terms of utopia. What I would like to look at is
how a judge applying humanitarian law, or rather how a judge, activist, or prosecutor, who wants to develop progressively and expand
the ambit of humanitarian protection, has to take into consideration
these two differing tendencies.
An instructive example is the somewhat artificial distinction between international and internal armed conflict. I recall Professor
Abi-Saab saying that when a civilian individual is willfully killed in
an armed conflict, whether it is international or internal, we are
speaking about the same thing, the same crime. As he said, we are
looking at the same man, but perhaps our spectacles are crooked so
we see two men standing there. The problem, therefore, is with our
spectacles, and not with the reality of the issue at hand. But, to what
extent can a tribunal disregard this distinction-created by States-in
favor of expanding the humanitarian protection of civilians in armed
conflict?
We had, in the Rule 61 decision on Milan Marti , President of the
Serbian Republic of Krajina, a case of rockets-cluster bombs-being thrown into Zagreb, killing numerous civilians, injuring many
others, and destroying civilian objects in what appears to be an internal armed conflict. Subsequently, Marti6 made a television appearance to announce proudly that he used the bombs as a measure of reprisal against the Croats for an earlier offensive in what was then
Sector West, a Serb controlled area in Croatia.
The problem we had was that while reprisals against civilians were
authoritatively prohibited in Protocol I of 1977, there was a conscious decision not to include a similar prohibition in Protocol II,
which regulated internal armed conflict. The exclusion of this provision, however, did not mean a contrario that reprisals against civilians were permissible. We were in a quandary as to how we could
find an applicable norm. Again, we see the tension between the state
consent view of international law and the justice oriented view,
where there is an opportunity to exploit the ambiguity in the law.

1520

AM. U. INT'L L. REV.

[13:1509

This was a very peculiar situation because during the negotiation
of Protocol II, many states expressly created this loophole with the
desire to have a free hand to crush a rebellion or insurgency. For
some reason, they believed that the standard that they would use in
crushing an internal rebellion should be different than the standard
they would use in an international armed conflict.
On the other hand, seven years earlier, the General Assembly
unanimously adopted Resolution 2675 of 1970. Paragraph 7 of this
prohibits reprisals against civilians in all circumstances, including
both international and internal armed conflicts. This resolution is
widely regarded as an authoritative expression of international custom. Thus, there was some inconsistency here.
Why would states say two different things seven years apart?
Could it perhaps be that the delegation in 1970 in the General Assembly did not have military lawyers or experts who understood the
technicalities of reprisals? Who knows? Whatever the case may be,
we had this ambiguity that we tried to exploit in favor of extending
the prohibition against reprisals to internal armed conflict.
Here the question was whether it is better to try to expand international humanitarian law. As we all know, this area of international
law developed in a very haphazard way, in part because of the peculiar structure of the international legislative process but also, in part,
because states want to create ambiguities. States want to have loopholes that do not curtail their power to use armed force. Thus, the
conduct of hostilities is the area in which the greatest ambiguities
exist in international humanitarian law. Correspondingly, it is the
area in which the greatest opportunities for progressive clarification
and development exist.
By expanding the ambit of humanitarian protection, do we risk
creating a law that is more in the tendency of a utopia in the sense
that it does not remotely reflect what states are actually willing to
concede? Or, will the jurisprudence of the Tribunal create a fait accompli? Will a surreptitious legislative process arise that can be used
by more progressive states in future treaty negotiations, future discussions, or future prosecutions before an international criminal court
to suggest that this is the law, even if it does not strictly meet the
standards of uniform and consistent practice required for a customary

1998]

CONTRIBUTION OFAD Hoc TRIBLNALS

1521

norm? Or, will such judicial activism undermine the Tribunal's
credibility in the eyes of States?
II. DIFFERING CONCEPTIONS OF FAIRNESS
Very quickly, I am going to move onto the issue of duress, which
Professor Meron mentioned. The duress issue I think is an interesting
case study, not so much in the tension between state consent or consent-oriented and justice-oriented views of international law, but
rather in the intersubjectivity of trying to determine what is just. It is
a reflection of how judges from different cultures and legal systems
may have differing conceptions of fairness. This is especially true
when international law does not provide any guidance as to the applicable norm and it is necessary to resort to policy considerations in
order to resolve ambiguities.
I speak here, in the presence of Judge McDonald, who gave me a
much easier time than some of the other judges did during the arguments on this issue in the Erdemovid case, which was the first appeals case before the Tribunal. Of course, the prosecution tried to argue (and I am going to speak in the third person in order to avoid
implicating myself) that international customary law stipulated that
duress cannot be applicable where the underlying crime is murder.
This argument had only three cases as its basis, two British and one
Canadian case before the post-Second World War trials. As President
Cassese said to me in wonderment and astonishment, "Mr. Prosecutor, you claim that the overwhelming weight of authority is in favor
of the proposition that duress is not a defense; but, I have fourteen
cases against your three!" I then had to explain why all of those
fourteen cases were irrelevant and only the three should stand.
The prosecution ultimately prevailed on this issue, but on policy
grounds. Judge McDonald and Judge Vohrah, with Judge Li concurring, concluded that there is no applicable norm of customary law.
Additionally, they found that the only general principle deducible
from various domestic legal systems was that duress mitigates the
culpability of a defendant guilty of murder. This was because civil
law systems allowed duress as a defense to all crimes, whereas common law systems excluded its application to murder though recognizing that it is a mitigating factor.
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After stating that policy rationales should not be abandoned in favor of "slavery to logic," Judges McDonald and Vohrah found that
duress would not be a defense in the narrow circumstance where the
defendant was a soldier. Because of the tremendous power in the soldier's hands, and because of the fact that dying is an occupational
hazard of a soldier, in this narrow instance a defense of duress should
not be admissible.
President Cassese, in a vigorous dissent, concluded that this decision was wholly unacceptable because judges cannot legislate and
because such resort to policy is unthinkable in a civil law system. He
based his main objection on the general principle that duress applies
as a defense in every instance with the exception that, in most common law jurisdictions, it does not apply to murder. Thus, the general
rule should prevail and not the exception.
In addition, on policy grounds, President Cassese went on to mention a variety of hypothetical scenarios where someone, for example,
in order to save the lives of ten people, may kill one person; or where
someone who is asked to kill someone rather than being killed himself should be able to kill in the sense that one person would be killed
anyway. He gave a variety of situations that he argued the common
law cases did not cover, and which had been discussed before the
court, and which would justify application of duress to murder.
Of course, the decision of Judges McDonald and Vohrah mentioned that prosecutorial discretion would be appropriate in these
situations so as not to indict an individual. To use Professor Meron's
example of the concentration camp victim being forced to kill a fellow inmate, the prosecutor would clearly be in a position not to indict.
Again, one sees the tension between common law and civil law
notions of prosecutorial discretion and differing notions of what is a
just or fair norm under such circumstances. As President Cassese
said, the prosecutor in certain systems may not have such discretion
and a much more categorical, less pragmatic approach towards the
law may be necessary. Furthermore, this suggests that if something is
wrong in principle, why try to remedy it through this sort of logically
inconsistent contrivance? In short, I am just trying to outline here
that there are differing conceptions of fairness among judges where
international law does not provide an applicable norm. These are

1998]

CONTRIBUTION OFAD HOC TRIB t'NALS

1523

some of the problems of jurisprudence with which the Tribunal will
have to deal.
CONCLUSION

The impulse to expand the ambit of humanitarian law is not always a good one. Perhaps I am saying this to the wrong audience, but
in certain circumstances, it can undermine humanitarian law to push
the law to a point where it is not likely to be accepted by states. By
states, we mean foreign ministry officials, diplomats, and so on. Additionally, in the case of "mega-crimes," such as crimes against humanity and genocide, dilution of the law may actually undermine the
human rights agenda by trivializing these crimes and the historical
legacy upon which they are built. In all cases, what is required is an
appreciation of the context and the delicate compromises that ultimately lead to an optimal result.

EMERGING JURISPRUDENCE ON CRIMES OF
SEXUAL VIOLENCE
PRESENTATION BY PATRICIA VISEUR-SELLERS
LEGAL ADVISOR FOR GENDER-RELATED CRIMES, OFFICE OF THE PROSECLTOR

INTRODUCTION

I am in a very fortunate position today. This is the first time that I
have attended a conference and heard so many speakers before me
speak on the topic of sexual violence in a very normative fashion. I
would like to congratulate not only the speakers but also the audience
for starting to understand that sexual violence under international
humanitarian law is as normal as rape is in war.
When the United Nations Secretary General put together the International Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and for
Rwanda, they gave us a legal framework under which we could
prosecute and investigate sexual violence. Under both statutes,
"crimes against humanity" enumerates rape but, in addition, the
Rwanda Tribunal went even further. Protocol II, which was incorporated under their Article 4, explicitly lists rape. Within the Yugosla-
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via Tribunal, we have interpreted Article 3, which just refers to
common Article 3, within our indictments, to include rape.
In addition, we have de-constructed sexual violence. As Deputy
Prosecutor Mr. Muna stated before, we have been able to allege
sexually violent conduct, as the actus reas for crimes, under a variety
of other provisions of the statute. What I would like to speak about
today is the emerging jurisprudence on sexual assault that is starting
to appear from both Tribunals.
I. PRESENTATION OF SEXUAL VIOLENCE EVIDENCE TO THE
TRIBUNALS

Most people will say, "There's been no big case yet. Where is your
rape case?" I would like to ask you to look at minutiae just for a minute. Within the prosecutor's office, we can present submissions of
evidence before the judges in several instances, such as in confirmation of an indictment, amendment of an indictment, and by motions-both pre-trial and during trial. Additionally, evidence is admissible during the trial and during an appellate proceeding,
particularly new evidence or evidence reviewing the law. In all of
those instances, the prosecutors of the Yugoslavia Tribunal have presented evidence of sexual violence before the judges, and in most of
those instances, the prosecutors have presented evidence in the
Rwanda Tribunal. Therefore, evidence of sexual violence has been
the subject of rulings and decisions by both Tribunals.
A. Presentationof Evidence at the Indictment Stage

The first instance when evidence of sexual violence is presentable
is the confirmation stage, or indictment, stage. The prosecutor must
meet a prima facie standard in order to prevail and have an indictment confirmed. What is a prima facie level? Article 19 states that
the judge of a trial chamber, if satisfied that the prosecutor has set
forth reasonable grounds-in other words, established a prima facie
case-shall confirm the indictment.
Upon confirmation of the Kayishema indictment, Judge Pillay,
from the Rwanda Tribunal, articulated two standards by which the
prima facie standard can be satisfied. The first test is whether the
facts and circumstances would justify a reasonable or ordinarily prudent man to believe that a suspect has committed a crime. By the
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second standard, a prima facie case is a credible case that, if not contradicted by the defense, would be a sufficient basis to convict the
accused of the charge.
In addition, Rule 47 says that the confirming judge may confirm or
dismiss each count. Based upon the prima facie standard, the ad hoc
Tribunals have reviewed and confirmed over 130 counts of sexual
violence within their indictments to date. This is law that judges are
starting to make and that other institutions, such as the ICJ, are
starting to cite. Thus, it is very important to look at this prima facie
standard, because although it is less than a burden of proof, its impact is still substantial.
I would like to note two examples. The first is the Gagovic and
Others case commonly referred to as the Foca indictment. This indictment alleges that during the takeover of the municipality of Foca
a number of Muslim females were repeatedly raped while detained
by Bosnian Serbs, paramilitary, and police forces.
Judge Vohrah of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former
Yugoslavia ("ICTY") reviewed the prosecutor's submission in the
Foca indictment, and determined that those acts of sexual violence
satisfied the prima facie standard under several provisions. For example, he found that rape as a crime against humanity, and as torture
within the grave breaches provisions under Article 2, as well as provisions of common Article 3 that we have charged under Article 3.
Most significantly, Judge Vohrah's confirmation of the Foca indictment affirmed the prosecution's allegation of the crime of enslavement based upon evidence of sexual violence.
A second example, is the Akayesu case in the Rwanda Tribunal.
Midway through the prosecution's presentation of evidence in that
case, we moved to amend to include sexual violence. There, the
prosecutor alleged that the sexual violence was evidence of genocide,
crimes against humanity, and violations of Protocol II couched under
Article 4 of the Rwanda Statute as rape.
In Akayesu, both the prosecution and the defense have rested. The
evidence is currently before the court awaiting the Chamber's final
judgment. Parts of the Gagovic and Other indictments, now known
as Kunarac, are currently before the court as well awaiting the
scheduling of a trial date. I will not comment on them further, but I
think we should recognize that there has already been a judicial con-
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firmation that the prosecution evidence satisfied the prima facie standard.
B. Presentationof Evidence at Rule 61 Hearings

At Rule 61 hearings, a confirmed indictment is presented to a
three-judge panel. The hearing is essentially an administrative
mechanism to show that a state has not complied with the indictment
in terms of arrest of the accused. In addition to that, the judges may
hear new evidence and then, in a type of mini-appellate procedure,
the panel may re-confirm the indictment based upon reasonable
grounds.
In July 1996, a panel heard a Rule 61 hearing for the Karadzic and
Mladic case. Within the determination that the indictment could be
re-confirmed, the court reviewed evidence of sexual violence presented by the prosecutor in the form of testimony given by an investigation commander and also one of the investigators of the sexual
assault team within the Office of the Prosecutor. In addition, the
judges themselves called for a presentation of oral testimony by a
former member of the Commission of Experts to determine the scope
of the sexual violence.
The judges considered this evidence as a basis for establishing that
the accused, Mr. Karadzic and Mr. Mladic, committed the charged
crimes. The testimony showed that inside camps and at other places,
many women and girls being detained were raped or subjected to
other forms of sexual assault by the Serbian soldiers and police, or by
their agents, with the consent and complicity of the detention unit officials. On a smaller scale, many men were also the victims of rape
and sexual assault by the Serbian forces. Various forms of sexual assault were practiced, including the castration of men, as well as assaults using a variety of objects, which were particularly degrading
for women. The judges considered this conduct part of the reasonable
grounds for reconfirming the indictment against Mr. Karadzic and
Mr. Mladic.
In addition, the court went further when looking at evidence of
genocide. Using Article 4(2)(b) of the Yugoslav statute, which basically incorporates the genocide Conventions, the court specifically
stated that causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of a
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through inhuman treatment, torture,

This type of judicial declaration concerning sexual violence does
not have a precedent. In the future, we hope that this pronouncement
will be just a tiny footnote in the jurisprudence on sexual violence.
C. Presentationof Evidence at PretrialMotions
In addition, evidence of sexual violence has been presented in
pretrial motions. Possibly the most relevant were the witness protection motions that we already have been spoken about briefly at this
conference.
Witness protection motions to the Yugoslavia Tribunal seem to
fashion what I would call the sexual assault sensitivity criteria. This
is not properly considered an exception, because it is not necessarily
exceptional. This sensitivity criteria means that for most witnesses to
get mere confidentiality-I am not speaking of anonymity-the
prosecutor must show a reasonable fear for the safety of the witness
or the witness' family. In terms of sexual violence, the Tadic witness
protection decision of August 1995 stated that the Tribunal was attempting to facilitate the sexual assault witnesses' appearance at the
Tribunal. In terms of confidentiality, the judge would grant these
witnesses such protection measures to encourage them to come forward.
Within about a year, in the matter of Delalic, which we commonly
call the Celebici case, the Tribunal confirmed the Tadic witness protection ruling. The Celebici decision also stated that judges reviewed
the witnesses who applied for confidentiality measures, they noted,
but did not entirely decide on whether there was a reasonable risk of
safety for the witness and the witness' family. To facilitate testimony
about sexual assaults, and because of the nature of the crime committed against them, the Chamber more readily granted confidentiality to these witnesses.
The Celebici decision is very important jurisprudence. We must
realize that the Chamber, through grants of witness protection, is
carving out a manner to facilitate the admission of a certain type of
evidence. This evidence was largely absent in the prosecutions in
Nuremberg and Tokyo. Interestingly, sexual assault evidence is often
absent from our national prosecutions as well.
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D. PresentationofEvidence at Rule 96 Motions
Another type of motion that was filed during the Celebici trial
must be spoken about with slight hesitation. It was the first motion
that the prosecutor filed actually citing Rule 96, which concerns evidence in cases of sexual assault.
During the testimony of the Celebici trial, one of the witnesses,
during cross-examination, referred to a type of medical procedure
performed on her. The prosecution filed a motion to redact that testimony, stating that it was illegal under Rule 96. In its last section,
Rule 96 states that prior sexual conduct shall not be admitted. The
judges conferred on this matter for what seemed to the prosecution a
very long time, about six weeks. Finally, they ruled that as a special
type of evidentiary rule, Rule 96 required the redaction of the evidence from the transcript in regard to this medical procedure.
This is a very interesting decision because submission of evidence
usually falls under Rule 89, which allows for the admission of evidence that is relevant and probative in nature. The judges of the
Celebici trial panel, however, said that Rule 96 was a special evidentiary rule. This ruling allows the use of Rule 89 for evidence submission, and Rule 96-to which there are no exceptions-for evidence
exclusion. Therefore, the ruling that Rule 96 excluded evidence of
prior sexual conduct appeared to end the debate. The policy rationale,
I imagine, concerns how evidence-even through a medical procedure-of any prior sexual conduct is relevant to sexual violence that
occurs during times of war.
II. SEXUAL ASSAULT JURISPRUDENCE: LESSONS FROM TADIC
Finally, I would just like to briefly go over the sexual assault jurisprudence from the Tadic case. Many people view this case, particularly the prosecution case, as something of a failure in terms of
sexual violence. Being the eternal optimist, I thought it was a fabulous success. I could not wait to read it and found absolute gems and
nuggets throughout it. I believe that the Tadic decision will be a forerunner of the richness of sexual assault jurisprudence.
I think the reason that my view differs from everyone else's is that
people concentrated on the withdrawal of the rape charge by "Witness F" or the withdrawal of testimony by "Witness L." That did oc-
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cur, and withdrawals of witness testimony will continue to occur in
the future. That happens during normal prosecutions; sometimes witnesses, for their own reasons, do not come forward. That is something that not only the prosecution has to accept, but the defense, the
judges, and the greater public as well.
The Tadic trial chamber heard four witnesses who spoke about
sexual violence. Two were members of the medical profession, in the
broadest sense; in fact, one was a veterinarian. A third witness was a
victim and the final witness was what I would call a forced perpetrator-victim. We have not quite devised the word for this type of witness. I am referring to Witness H, who was granted anonymity.
The first two testimonies, medical testimonies, were from people
who were determined at one of the camps. Various people came to
these witnesses to tell about either their own rape, or the rape of others they knew. Importantly, these two witnesses were not eyevitnesses to any sexual violence or rapes. Thus, their testimony is technically hearsay. Nonetheless, the trial chamber permitted the
evidence under Rule 89. Because the eyewitnesses thought they were
speaking to medical personnel, this evidence might be inherently reliable, or, for lack of a better word, a hearsay exception.
One medical witness, Mr. Gustic, testified and the decision quotes
him: "The act of rape had a terrible effect on them. They could perhaps explain it to themselves when someone stole something from
them, or committed beatings or even killings; but when the rapes
started, everybody in the camp, both men and women, lost hope.
There was such horrible fear." The court permitted this testimony
and that of another medical witness. The court found that this testimony was part of the establishment of the preliminary facts and was
admissible to show that sexually violent conduct was part of the
crimes that occurred within the camp.
In addition, the court subsequently heard the testimony of victim
survivors of rape, but not one that Mr. Tadic himself had personally
sexually violated. This testimony came from an extremely brave
woman, who did not ask for any type of confidentiality or anonymity. She was very clear that she wanted the perpetrators within the
camp to see her and know that she survived. She testified that during
the takeover of Prijedor, Bosnian Serbs raped her at the military barracks, at her home during the search and seizure, and again after
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taking her into police custody. During her subsequent internment at
the Omarska camp, according to her testimony, camp guards raped
her five times.
The court, in their decision, interpreted testimony of rape as evidence of discriminatory intent. The prosecutor currently is appealing
this requirement of discriminatory intent in connection with crimes
against humanity. I think it is very interesting, however, that the
court construed the evidence to show that one's religious or ethnic
background could prompt a sexual assault, and that sexual assaults of
that type are evidence of discriminatory intent. I think that is an extremely important and even broad construction of how sexual violence that takes place during war and can be legal evidence of "jurisdiction elements" of international crimes.
Finally, the court heard testimony from "Witness H." This witness,
as stated earlier, received anonymity. H testified that he was specifically asked to lick the bottom and suck the penis of another male detainee. In addition, H was forced to bite that detainee's testicles while
the on-looking uniformed men shouted to him, "bite harder!" According to his testimony, G, a third detainee, was finally made to bite
off the testicles of the victim.
Other witnesses besides H described Mr. Tadic as standing among
the uniformed men. The court then considered what the culpability of
Mr. Tadic would be for his acts, using 7(1) of the Yugoslav statute,
which relates to direct criminal responsibility. Based on this, the
court reasoned that they must determine whether Tadic's conduct,
which the prosecution had proved beyond a reasonable doubt, sufficiently connected him to the crime so that liability could attach.
For precedent, the court looked at the Mattenhaus case, one of the
subsequent trials in Nuremberg. It noted that when people worked at
the camp--understanding that it was a type of criminal enterprise,
and continued to perform their functions-they intended to bring
about the consequences of the illegal acts. Thus, the court reasoned
that Mr. Tadic was more than merely present at the scene of criminal
activity; as mere presence is not sufficient, particularly if it is an ignorant or unwilling presence. The court stated that when an accused
is present, participates in the beating of one person, and remains with
a group as the group continues the beating, the accused should be
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viewed as participating via encouragement in the second beating as
well.
Therefore, Mr. Tadic was found guilty of crimes against humanity
for inhumane acts under Article 3, and violations of law and customs
of war for cruel treatment arising from the testicle incident. Although
he did not physically touch the victims or force the perpetrators, and
he did not speak a word during the incident, his more than mere
presence was viewed as encouraging the activity.
This decision, and this manner of examining the evidence of sexual violence, is remarkable and straightforward. It should not be forgotten that these acts resulted in a conviction for male sexual assault
under international law.
CONCLUSION

There are many cases currently before the court that will expand
sexual violence jurisprudence even further. The cases of Akeyesu, as
I stated before, will construe sexual violence in terms of genocide.
The case of Kayishemna looks at sexual violence that caused death.
The case of Furundzija, which soon will be before the Yugoslav
court, will look at the act of a commander charged with conducting
an interrogation while the victim was being raped. In addition, with
Mr. Kunarac, part of the Foca indictment, we will be able to look at
an accused in a position of authority as a direct sexual assault perpetrator.
The importance of our jurisprudence has not been lost on either the
ICJ or the European Court for Human Rights; they have already cited
to us. I believe that the judges at the Rwanda and Yugoslav Tribunals
should be very proud of the work to date on sexual violence jurisprudence.

PANEL COMMENTARY
W. HAYS PARKS
SPECIAL AsSISTANT TO THE ARMY JUDGE ADVOCATll GENERAL

It is my privilege to comment on these very valuable presentations
and to do so from a slightly different viewpoint. I try to look at the
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larger picture of international law and its development. In my
classes, I try to describe how treaty law codifies international law,
more often than not, in general terms-although the participants at
the time may not realize the terms they are using are going to be
quite general.
Treaty law, particularly in the area of the law of war, the law of
armed conflict, is notorious for codifying laws for conflicts just completed. Certainly, the major references for the Tribunal, that is the
1949 Geneva Conventions, did an excellent job of codifying law for
a conflict that ended four years before.
I think-as Ben Ferencz, who is sitting here in the front row can
tell you-with respect to the post-World War II war crimes tribunals,
the courts in The Hague and Rwanda are engaged in the very difficult
task of flushing out codified and uncodified law in many areas. Each
tribunal is doing something for the first time-blazing new trailsand we should give them credit for that.
For The Hague Tribunal, the task has been made all the more difficult by a very complex set of circumstances with respect to the nature of the conflict. I would describe this as a situation beyond the
wildest imagination of the most innovative author of a Jessup moot
court problem. The Tadic case shows how they have tried to resolve
many of the issues raised to date. The decisions of the courts, of
course, are binding only upon the parties before them at the time and
not necessarily upon nations. It is now up to governments actually to
take those cases and decisions and to sort out what is of continuing
precedential value to them.
In my official capacity, one of my jobs is to draft substantial portions of the new United States Joint Services Law of War Manual. It
is going to be very comprehensive. I can tell you that the cases to
date have been absolute gold mines of information to me. They have
assisted me very substantially in my drafting.
You certainly can gather from the discussions on this panel that
one may look at what has transpired as a glass half empty or a glass
half full. I would suggest that in fact what we are seeing is only the
beginning. The Tribunals are still waiting to adjudicate a number of
cases.
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If we were to look at the post-World War II tribunal process at this
same relative point of time, we would see a very incomplete picture.
What I am suggesting, with respect to my distinguished colleague,
Professor Meron, is that I am perhaps a bit more optimistic about the
progress the Tribunals have made already. I agree more with Ms.
Viseur-Sellers that we are finding gems and nuggets of great value in
the decisions to date. They are certainly not all that we might have
hoped them to be in some cases, but in other cases and other regards,
their specificity has been of great value. Thus, the picture that we are
looking at is still being drawn, and I recommend patience as the two
Tribunals continue their very challenging and difficult task.
With respect to Mr. Akhavan's presentation, he touched on a point
that I think is quite important: What is customary law'? It is one thing
for us as professors to talk about what customary law should be. It is
quite another for a prosecutor to convince a Tribunal that in fact that
point has been attained.
The easy way to talk about whether or not the 1949 Geneva Conventions are customary international law is to point out that ninetyeight percent of the nations of the world today are parties to the 1949
Geneva Conventions. Next year, these Conventions will celebrate
their fiftieth anniversary. Therefore, one may infer that in fact they
are customary international law.
The problem with that premise, of course, is that many nations
have done nothing yet to implement the Conventions. Let me give
you an example from 1990. At that time, a coalition was organizing
to liberate Kuwait from the Iraqi invasion. The various parties in that
coalition convened a meeting to talk about various subjects, one of
which was how to handle enemy prisoners of war. The United States
delegate suggested following the Geneva Conventions. The representative of another coalition country said that his country was not a
party to the Conventions. Someone had to remind him that his country ratified the Conventions in 1955.
It is very important to appreciate that nations that have not been
challenged by war since the time they ratified the 1949 Geneva Conventions, in many cases, have done very little to think about them.
The mere ratification or accession to treaties is not necessarily an indication that nations have taken all the other steps that they are
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bound to take by the Geneva Conventions to complete implementation.
One value of the ad hoc tribunals has been the assessment of exactly what customary law is, and what it is not. They are separating
the wheat from the chaff. One may not always agree, and certainly
not all of the judges have agreed in all the cases, but the decisions to
date have advanced our understanding of which parts of the law of
war now constitute customary law.
I think Ms. Viseur-Sellers' presentation is extremely important.
We were talking before the panel began and I have searched in my
mind to try to figure out why the post-World War II tribunals and the
drafters of the 1949 Geneva Conventions said virtually nothing about
sexual assault. You will not find the word "rape" anywhere in most
of these documents; it is simply not there. The only thing I can figure
is that half a century ago, modesty prevented its use. I think that we
are emerging from that modesty and I think the work that she is doing is extremely important. Sexual violence during times of war is
something that has to be on the table; it is something that has to be
recognized. I commend her for her work.

ROBERT K. GOLDMAN
PROFESSOR OF LAW, AMERICAN UNIVERSITY WASHINGTON COLLEGE OF LAW

Before I open the time remaining for questions, I want to make a

couple of observations myself.
This panel has dealt primarily with the contributions of the work
of the Tribunals to international humanitarian law. It is also important to realize, as Patricia mentioned to some extent, that the Tribunals are having an impact on the development and interpretation of
human rights law. I was struck by, for instance, Payam's discussion
about the problem of dealing with the absence of an express prohibition against reprisals against civilians. Obviously, there is the notion
in human rights law that no person can ever be subject to summary
execution, and certainly not by a state or its agent.
Coincidentally, my colleague Dean Grossman and I are members
of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights ("Commission"), and we have been following very closely the work of the Tribunals. Spurred on by some of the progressive developments and in-

1998]

CONTRIBUTION OF AD Hoc TRIBtAALS

1535

terpretations as well as its own convictions, the Commission, in a series of cases last year, determined that it had clear competence to directly apply rules of international humanitarian law. Additionally, the
Commission determined its competence to find violations of humanitarian rules as well. Finally, the Commission may interpret articles in the American Conventions on Human Rights by reference to
definitional standards in humanitarian law, such as distinctions as to
who are civilians and who are combatants.
Increasingly, the Commission is receiving complaints arising from
the Andean region and Mexico. The Commission is faced with the
task of how to characterize conflicts in these countries, and dealing
with complaints, alleging deaths and injury to civilians arising out of
the conduct of military operations. The only way the Commission
has been able to do these tasks is to look to the appropriate definitional standards found in humanitarian law. These standards allow
distinctions based on, for instance, whether an attack was permissible
under the circumstances, or whether the person attacked was actively
participating in hostilities at the time.
The Commission has followed the Tribunals's jurisprudence, and
it has weighed heavily in our deliberations in these areas. Moreover,
the Commission is taking its cue from that part of the Tadic case,
which indicated that it is nonsensical to think that common Article 3
and Protocol II conflicts the fundamental rules of Hague law governing the conduct of hostilities somehow do not apply.
Two other developments are extremely important. Whether or not
one agrees that the grave breaches provisions of the Geneva Conventions apply or should apply to internal conflicts, to me what was
most important was what was done in the Tadic case when the appellate chamber held that serious violations of common Article 3 and
Protocol II entail individual criminal responsibility and therefore
subject the perpetrators to individual liability.
The Commission, as many of you know, was the first international
organization to clearly declare amnesties for serious violations of
human rights-such as murder, torture, and enforced disappearances-to be in violation of the American Convention. Implicitly,
the Convention requires ensuring that, through appropriate remedies,
the perpetrators of human rights violations-state agents-be subjected to individual criminal investigation, tried, and punished. Con-
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sistent with the Convention, measures of clemency should be given
only after such punishment.
I would note to you today one historic thing that happened last
week, when the Parliament of Argentina voted to repeal the amnesty
laws that were voted by the parliament in the late 1980s during
democratic regimes. This vote is a first, and is certainly an act that
the Commission will probably commend to others.
The work of the ICTY has established individual criminal responsibility for serious violations of rules of international humanitarian
law are applicable to non-international armed conflicts. Moreover,
the International Committee of the Red Cross's written communication to the Tribunal's prosecutor indicates that Article 6 of Protocol
II, which allows the broadest possible amnesty at the conclusion of
hostilities, cannot cover serious violations of international humanitarian law. The combination of these actions makes it easier for the
Commission to tell states, particularly states in this hemisphere continuing to engage in internal armed conflict: "Not only must you stop
illicit conduct, you must sanction it. And, at the conclusion of hostilities, you cannot give an amnesty to state agents or to members of
dissident armed groups that committed serious violations of international humanitarian law."
I want to say on my own, and on behalf of my colleagues on the
Commission, that we are grateful for the work of the Tribunals; it is
having an impact. We routinely review the cases decided by the Tribunal and cite its jurisprudence in new decisions of the Commission.

AUDIENCE QUESTIONS
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Professor Meron alluded to the importance of
the Tribunals' jurisprudence-not just in terms of humanitarian law,
but international law as well-when he referred to the Commission's
affirmation of its jurisdiction and competence. This is essentially a
judgment about what the Security Council did when it established the
Tribunals. My question for Professor Meron, and anyone else, is:
Could you comment on that in a little bit more detail because that has
rather serious implications for the international law system as a
whole. The International Court of Justice ("ICJ"), for example, is
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potentially facing the same issue in the Pan Am 103 case, and one
can imagine that the issue could arise in other situations both before
the ICJ and other bodies. Some scholars have argued that tribunals,
such as the ICTY or the ICJ, are not competent to judge the validity
of Security Council action.
PROFESSOR MERON: I said that the Hague Tribunal was perhaps

not enthused about being given the task of examining the Security
Council's competence in establishing the Tribunals, but it was compelled to do so by Mr. Wladimiroff.
The Tribunal, I think, adopted an extremely important decision by
discussing those questions in a very reasoned and scholarly way. Its
conclusion, that the Security Council may establish tribunals of this
kind in situations involving Chapter VII, is actually limited in scope.
With recognition by the international community that gross violations of human rights or humanitarian law pose a threat to international peace, it falls within the power of the Security Council to create ad hoc tribunals. You will recall that one of the provisions of the
draft statute of the international criminal court-this is a very important residual provision-allows the Security Council to confer on
the future International Criminal Court ("ICC") functions, which
would actually be functions of ad hoc tribunals. We must assume that
many of the rogue states will not accede to the jurisdiction of the
ICC. Thus, in order to have a court with a muscle, we absolutely
must reserve this capacity for the Security Council to do that.
If I may, I would just like to make a small comment on what, my
friend, Hays Parks said, and relate it to what also Bob Goldman said.
I really intended my review of the jurisprudence of the Hague to be
very positive. The fact that I found it necessary to criticize some aspects was simply because I think it is good for any institution to hear
critical comments. Especially as the appeal in the Tadic case will
soon be heard, I think it is important to encourage the Tribunal to
correct its course on important issues.
There is no question that both Hays and Bob Goldman were extremely right in saying that the impact of the Hague Tribunal on the
development of the concept of customary law is extraordinarily important. The Hague Tribunal gave customary law a very expansive
reading and applied Hague law to non-international armed conflicts
as well.
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There is a synergistic relationship between the Tribunals, between
views of governments, and between views of international institutions. Were it not for the Hague Tribunal's contribution to the clarification of these issues, and for the first ever statement that common
Article 3 and others are applicable in terms of criminal liability, we
surely could not have had, on the 23rd of March, a statement by the
United States Delegation to the Preparatory Committee on the establishment of the ICC, consisting of three points that are of extraordinary importance for the future of international law. The first was a
clear statement that in the view of the United States, crimes against
humanity are not dependent on a nexus with armed conflict. This is
very much in line with what the Tribunal said. Second, in the view of
the United States, serious violations of the customary common Article III should be the centerpiece of the ICC's jurisdiction. Third,
certain rules pertaining to the conduct of hostilities must be regarded
as applicable to non-international armed conflict.
It is good international law and good policy to make serious violations of such fundamental rules a part of ICC's jurisdiction. Can you
imagine the United States making this statement without the background and foundation of the Hague decisions? Surely not.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: I am with the American Coalition Information Network and Advocacy Group for the Kurds in the Middle East.
I want to express my appreciation for the work that you do to heal
and to strengthen our humanity in the face of lapses into the abyss.
Having paid you my homage in this fashion, I feel at liberty to tell
you that what you have described does not just happen in "Country
Y" or "Country R." Is it fair for the United Nations to pick countries
R and Y and not other countries? Would it be better for countries to
apply to tribunals on their own?
PROFESSOR MERON: The only point I would make is that there is
an important problem of selectivity, perhaps not so much from the
legal perspective, but from the moral perspective. That is one of the
reasons why we are now moving from the idea of ad hoc tribunals to
a permanent tribunal, which would hopefully not be based on selectivity.
MR. AKHAVAN: As someone with origins in the region-I was
raised in the Middle East-I am happy that Judge McDonald mentioned the case of the Kurds-not after the war with Kuwait, when

1998]

CONTRIBUTION OFAD Hoc TRBUNALS

153
1539

Hussein became the bad guy during the Iran-Iraq war, but when he
was the good guy. I refer here to the massacre in 1988 of several
thousand Kurdish civilians by means of chemical weapons and the
ambivalent response of the international community thereto.
The problem is that we are speaking about a very primitive political culture. The Yugoslavia and Rwanda Tribunals are the very early
glimmerings of international justice. What you see with these cases
of selective justice, for the first time in the history of the United Nations, is the gradual internalization of the notion of international accountability into a hitherto entrenched culture of impunity.
In his provocative article on the Yugoslavia Tribunal in Foreign
Affairs some time ago, Professor Meron speaks about how humanitarian law has now entered the mainstream of decision making. This
was unthinkable within the United Nations system, even just a few
years ago. Additionally, as Judge Arbour mentioned during the lunch
hour discussion, states are still extremely reluctant, not only about
having their officials indicted, but about having their dirty laundry
aired in public.
The war between Iran and Iraq lasted for eight years, and was the
reflection of a very cynical policy of divide and rule. Hussein was
treated, at best with indifference. At worst, he was given active support. Now we are beginning to see that the stockpile of weapons that
have been destroyed, have been the very same weapons that the
western powers originally supplied when the geopolitical situation
was different.
When I have spoken to government officials, they are adamant
about an international criminal court to cover the Kuwaiti invasion
and the aftermath against the Kurds. No one, however, wants to talk
about the years between 1980 and 1988, in which over one million
people were killed. The fact is that an impartial investigation will
necessarily implicate some of the western powers that were supplying armaments, including chemical weaponry to Saddam Hussein.
My hope is that once we have established a precedent for punishing
war crimes in certain situations, it will be increasingly accepted, even
in the cynical mindset of international politics, that similar situations
have to be treated in a similar fashion.

